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The lack of success in dealing with the inconsistency between positive attitudes and 
ecological behaviors, and in explaining why people fail to act pro-environmentally is still 
widespread in practice and research. In our view, this has to do with three main reasons: 1) A 
positivity fallacy - the belief shared by many researchers and practitioners that as long as 
people have the right (or positive) attitudes, intentions, skills, information, etc., the right pro-
ecological action should follow; thus, they disregard the importance of negative determinants 
in explaining the attitude-behavior inconsistency. 2) Lack of a psychological level of 
explanation; even when negative determinants are considered, the psychological explanation 
is often disregarded or incompletely identified, with most of the factors identified being 
socio-economical, or urban planning and architectural, etc. However, factors explaining why 
people fail to act can also be viewed within a psychological level of explanation, with 
behavior considered to be the result of an interaction between contextual variables and 
psychological processes. 3) Underestimation of the unconscious processes influence; 
contextual effects on behavior can be mediated not only by conscious perception but also by 
cognitive processes of which people are not aware of. Given these reasons, a model of 
psychological barriers and constraints is proposed (DN-Work model; “Didn’t work”) trying 
to integrate negative determinants within a psychological explanatory model of pro-
ecological behavior. This model aims to represent a process view regarding how a conflict 
between pro-ecological and anti-ecological behavioral goals can be produced, given the 
presence of two types of barriers and constraints: a) perceived barriers and constraints, and b) 
unconscious barriers and constraints. We briefly present two studies based on this model. 
These studies address habit accessibility as an unconscious behavioral barrier on ecological 
decisions to buy organic products, mediated by the effect of behavioral-goals activation from 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
THE POSITIVE FALLACY 
 
Being “positive” in life is not always a good thing, especially if you work in the field 
of Environmental Education and Behavior Change. Many projects in this area are biased by a 
“positivity fallacy”, i.e. the belief that as long as people develop the right attitudes, intentions, 
skills, information, etc., the right pro-ecological behavior should follow. However, as 
informed by the social sciences literature, an inconsistency exists between attitudes and 
behaviors, with cross-country studies showing high levels of ecological concern but, at the 
same time, low levels of ecological action (e.g. Ferreira Marques, Palma-Oliveira, Marques, 
& Ferreira 1995). In our view, one of the causes of such inconsistency is an underestimation 
of the factors working as barriers and constraints to ecological behavior change and to the 
promotion of pro-ecological behavioral goals (i.e. factors which increase the attitude-
behavior inconsistency). Hence, the “right” factors do not seem to be enough to promote 
behaviors consistent with one’s positive attitudes, beliefs, etc. 
This “positivity fallacy” is also evident in research on ecological behavior regarding 
models that intend to identify the “positive determinants” of action (i.e. factors that when 
present can promote a new behavior or increase the strength of an existing one.) 
Consequently, the barriers and constraints to pro-ecological behaviors are seen as lacking 
factors, i.e. factors that influence pro-ecological behavior in a negative way, due to absence 
or weak influence of a positive determinant or “right” factor. One example is provided by 
Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof’s (1999) Value-Belief-Norm Model, in which it is 
implicit that, if people lack altruistic personal values or an ecocentric orientation towards 
nature, for example, pro-ecological behavior should not develop. Other models are more 
explicit regarding these negative factors, as it is the case of Kollmuss and Agyeman’s (2002) 
model identifying the lack of internal incentives, environmental consciousness, external 
possibilities and incentives, and the negative or insufficient feedback about behavior.  
One problem with this view is that it fails in acknowledging the fact that people’s 
behavior is influenced by situations. Even if people have a strong intention to behave in a 
pro-ecological way, the situation can be perceived as inhibitive (Corraliza & Berenguer, 
2000), leading to inaction. In this sense, models and projects based on a “positivity fallacy” 
only identify “what people are supposed to do” given the right factors – prescriptive view - 
but not “what people actually do” when they are in a certain situation – descriptive view.  
Identifying “what people actually do” implies identifying the reasons why people fail to act 
pro-ecologically, being this the aim of our chapter. 
 
THE NEED FOR A MORE INTEGRAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 
 
A number of behavioral models try to explain why people fail to act. However, most 
of the negative factors analyzed so far are non-psychological in nature (e.g. socio-economic). 
These factors are seen as having their influence outside the person’s intention or will and are 
represented as a direct effect of situations on people’s behavior. Thus, no matter how strong 
the commitment to perform a behavior is, how positive the ecological attitude is, or how 
responsible a person feels in its performance, the situation can directly inhibit behavior.  
One example, presented in the literature as a situational barrier to recycling behavior, 
is garbage-containers spatial accessibility (Schultz, Oskamp & Mainieri, 1995). The less 
spatially accessible (i.e. the more distant) the waste disposal facilities are, the lower the 
probability that people will separate at home and dispose the waste in the right recycling bins. 
This problem appears to be more related to design and urban planning issues than to people’s 
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“fault” and can be labeled as a “blame it on the situation” effect, as manifested in the 
literature regarding ecological behavior. In addition, this approach does not explain why 
when people’s dispositions and the situation are both facilitative (e.g. spatially accessible 
containers + positive attitudes and intentions; etc.), people still do not behave in the “right 
way.” Thus, the approach provides an incomplete account of the interaction between 
situations and psychological processes. 
Additional examples pertaining the negative effect of situations on pro-ecological 
behavior are the influence of exterior temperature on domestic energy consumption levels 
(Olsen, 1981); the inadequacy of infra-structures, like ergonomic features and transportation 
network planning, on different ecological behaviors (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002); the 
influence of place of residence and other demographic variables on driving behavior (e.g. 
Tanner, 1999); and the absence of income on purchasing energy-efficient devices 
(Constanzo, Archer, Aronson & Pettigrew, 1986). These factors correspond to levels of 
explanation from disciplines other than psychology (economy, sociology, architecture, etc.), 
thus the situation’s effect on behavior is not assessed within a psychological level of 
explanation. Our criticism is not intended to imply that non-psychological factors and 
psychological variables should not be assessed together when an attitude-and-behavior-
change intervention is designed. What we alert is that by assessing only these non-
psychological factors, researchers and practitioners are often prevented from seeing them 
through a “psychological lens” (as lay people usually do) and implicitly dismiss their 
importance and explanatory power.  
One illustration of this case comes from Gardner and Stern’s (2002; Stern & Oskamp, 
1987) causal model of resource-consumption behavior. These authors identify internal and 
external psychological and non-psychological “limiting factors” which prevent people from 
acting based on their pro-ecological attitudes. Such factors are classified ranging from the 
highest level of causality (variables with the strongest influence on behavior) to the lowest, 
respectively: 1) resource-use or resource-saving behavior; 2) attention, and behavioral 
commitment; 3) knowledge; 4) attitudes and beliefs; 5) values and worldviews; 6) external 
incentives and constraints; and 7) household background. External and internal barriers can 
be found within these levels, with their influence being higher for high-cost or difficult 
actions (i.e. stronger influence as attitude-behavior inconsistency factors). Thus, for example, 
an inconsistency between attitudes (level 4) and behavior (level 1) could be due to internal 
barriers like absence of the necessary behavioral knowledge (level 3) or the absence of either 
attention or behavioral commitment (level 2). In opposition, the influence of external barriers 
is higher on household background (7) and external incentives and constraints (6) levels, 
which can inhibit the development of positive values and worldviews (level 5), and both 
attitudes and beliefs (level 4). According to Gardner and Stern (2002), these external barriers 
can be associated with people’s socioeconomic background, available technology, economic 
forces, inconvenience, etc.  
A problem with these models is that, more than identifying all the possible 
psychological and non-psychological explanatory factors and how they independently affect 
behavior, we researchers should consider their effect in a synergistic way. In other words, we 
should analyze how situations and psychological processes interact to influence behaviors, in 
order to increase the models’ explanatory power.  One example of this was given by 
Talarowsky (1982) in a study on water conservation during a drought situation. This study 
showed that when residents considered that the drought was due to environmental reasons, 
they tended to conserve water within the limits proposed by the authorities. However, when 
they thought that individual consumption was the cause of water scarcity, the limits on 
consumption average were exceeded. The latter allowed the attribution of other’s 
responsibility implying a belief such as: "(...) if the crisis is due to other people’s behavior, 
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then my behavior will not alter much the situation and it is better to continue using water 
because if I don’t, others will do it in my place” (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 
2004, p.5; Palma-Oliveira & Correia dos Santos, 1998).  
Thus, the non-psychological behavioral barriers and constraints can also be seen in a 
psychological level of explanation, because a perceptual component is involved. 
Accordingly, one of the main psychological principles regarding how people interact with 
their environment is that we are the “builders” of our own reality (Smith & Mackie, 1995). 
People can construct their own reality through social and cognitive processes and thus, some 
aspect of people’s environment can work as a behavioral barrier if people perceive that aspect 
in such a way. In other words, the limiting non-psychological factors (Gardner & Stern, 
2002) which are present in the situation can have their effect on behavior mediated by 
perception-based processes, translated into an interaction between psychological factors and 
the situation.  
 
BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS ON ECOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
PERCEPTUAL FACTORS  
 
Situational factors negatively affecting behavior through the mediation of perceptual 
processes are called perceived barriers and constraints (Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004). They can 
be considered “true” negative determinants of action, since they do not correspond to an 
absence or weak influence of a positive determinant. Accordingly, in the example regarding 
garbage containers accessibility, a barrier/constraint could be the perceived cost and difficulty 
in performing the behavior, in terms of mental effort, time, motivation level, and degree of 
discomfort in the performance of behavior (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004; 
Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). A study by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1992) supports this 
idea, showing that small-effort behaviors like recycling are performed more frequently than 
large-effort behaviors like car use reduction, with this difference being attributed to the 
perceived costs vs. benefits.  
Another example comes from the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), which 
apart from analyzing two positive behavioral determinants (attitude and subjective norm), 
identifies a process which is similar to the costs/benefits analysis, named “perceived 
behavioral control” (PBC; Ajzen, 1991). The idea is that since there are many behavioral 
constraints that may limit volitional control, it is useful to analyze people’s perception of 
these constraints, which serves as a “proxy” for actual control of their behavior, to the extent 
that these perceptions are close to reality (Ajzen, 2002). Hence, a low PBC functions as a 
negative determinant because the individual can perceive that behavior is not under her/his 
control and that there are strong external constraints impeding its performance, decreasing the 
intention to perform it. Other studies in Environmental Psychology use similar concepts, like 
for example, perceived behavioral barriers (Mckenzie-Mohr, 2000), perceived behavioral 
costs (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) or perceived difficulty (De Young, 1988-1989). These 
perceptions can be seen as a product of expectancy or perceived likelihood of reaching a goal 
(e.g. “How likely is that I separate residues at home?”) and goal value (e.g. “How important 
is for me to separate residues at home?”) (Förster, Liberman & Friedman, 2007). 
Apart from the expectancy/value assessments, other types of perceptions of the 
situation exist as, for instance, biased perceptions due to the influence of beliefs. For 
example: someone has a belief that water-scarcity problem resolution depends on technology 
and that someday a successful and non-expensive way to use water from glaciers, atmosphere 
or another source will be found. Beliefs like this, that according to Thompson and Barton 
(1994) are based on an anthropocentric orientation, will function as limiting factors to 
 
 Why people fail        
conserve water because individuals will expect ecological problems to be solved through 
technological improvements and not through individual and societal behavioral change. If 
people add to this a belief that, in spite of what is said in the media about environmental 
problems, water is an abundant resource (Biel & Garling, 1995), the need of water 
conservation will be minimized and underestimated (see Corral-Verdugo, 2002). 
Another type of perceived barriers and constraints refers to perceptions about the self 
and one’s own behaviors. In this regard, research has shown that the tendency to break social 
norms, or antisocial behavior (conceptualized in terms of the perception of how frequently 
people engage in antisocial actions), can inhibit water conservation. Anti-ecological behavior 
can be seen as an instance of more general antisocial behavior (Corral-Verdugo, Frias-
Amenta, Gonzalez-Lomelí, 2003; Corral-Verdugo & Frías-Armenta, 2006). Also, we can 
include the perceptions regarding other people, translated into the influence of explicit 
cognitive representations working as perceived barriers and constraints, such as: stereotypes 
regarding environmentalists (Stoll-Kleemann, 2001), attitudinal ambivalence (Costarelli & 
Colloca, 2004), anti-environmental subjective norms (Schultz, Oskamp & Mainieri, 1995) or 
anti-environmental attitudes (Palma-Oliveira & Garcia-Marques, 1988).  
As a conclusion, we can see that perception-based factors are important because by 
analyzing them we can identify the underlying factors characterizing a certain context and 
behavior (Suárez, 1998). Moreover, there is idiosyncrasy in these factors, since what might 
be a barrier for one person might not be for another. Consequently, different perceptions 
might imply different interventions to change attitudes and behaviors and they should be 
assessed.  
These perceptions do not occur in a situational void and even when they are biased in 
some way, they are still associated with one or more situationally perceived characteristics 
(e.g. recycling behaviors of relevant people; availability and price of organic products in a 
supermarket shelve; location of a garbage disposal facility; amount of litter in a public space, 
etc.). We perceive these situational characteristics in a broad way from the most concrete to 
the most abstract levels, including not only the context’s physical features and tangible 
aspects but also those characteristics associated with social environments and events 
happening in there, like other people’s behaviors and attitudes, for example. By identifying 
these perceived barriers and constraints, we try to bring the situation back to the study of 
barriers and constraints on ecological behavior, yet within a psychological level of 
explanation.  
 
A SITUATION-BASED APPROACH ON ECOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
An example of a model that acknowledges the influence of the situation as mentioned, 
is provided by Tanner (1999) based on the Ipsative Theory of Behavior (e.g. Frey, 1989). 
Although still including some non-psychological factors (the “objective constraints”) it 
represents an evolution compared to the previous examples, because it goes beyond the 
“positivity fallacy” and explicitly considers an analysis of pro-ecological behavior negative 
determinants based on the situation. According to this author, there are three classes of 
constraints, which are conceived as internal and external conditions inhibiting the 
performance of an action: 1) Ipsative constraints – internal factors that prevent the activation 
of a particular behavioral alternative from occurring, i.e. the action can only be performed if 
the individual remembers to perform it, implying the assessment of a limited number of 
alternatives and without considering the pro-ecological option in them; 2) Subjective 
constraints – perceived factors that inhibit preference for a particular behavioral alternative or 
willingness to act; these constraints entail beliefs of what is possible or not, desired or not, or 
allowed or not, so that they can eliminate behavioral options based on that assessment; 3) 
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Objective constraints – external factors that prevent the performance of a particular behavior 
alternative from occurring, which are independent from individuals’ perception (lack of 
opportunities, mental and physical disabilities; low income; influence of legal and political 
institutions; etc.).  
Apart from this model, methodological approaches have also been used to assess the 
situation’s effect on behavior (e.g. Kaiser & Keller, 2001). Still, as in the previous example, 
they are mainly descriptive and do not explain how the situation can affect behavior through 
the mediation of psychological processes. Nevertheless, they consider some “invisible” 
factors scarcely identified in research (ipsative constraints; Tanner, 1999; implicit situational 
factors; Kaiser & Keller, 2001), which should be more profoundly studied. This study should 
be complemented with a process view, to understand how contexts can inhibit or constrain 
people’s behavior, outside their awareness and conscious control.  
 
THE “INVISIBLE” FACTORS 
 
Situation’s effect on behavior can be mediated not only by perception-based processes 
but also by cognitive processes of which people are not aware of, which can work as 
unconscious barriers and constraints. Accordingly, since the 1960’s, research in social 
psychology has increasingly demonstrated the relative automaticity of social behavior and the 
influence of cognitive and motivational factors outside people’s awareness on behavior 
(Bargh, 1997). These factors are rarely considered in both Environmental Education and 
Behavioral Change projects and in models of barriers and constraints on ecological behavior, 
and when they are, they are not explicitly identified as such.  
To be clear on how the automatic processes affect behavior, it is important to 
understand what we mean by “unconscious” and “conscious” processes and the differences in 
the way they are initiated to influence social behavior. Conscious processes are mental acts of 
which we are aware, that are intentional, effortful and controllable (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999). In a different way, for a process to be automatic and unconscious, it has to be 
effortless and to occur when a set of preconditions are in place (conditional automaticity), 
without any conscious choice or guidance from that point on (Bargh, 1997). Hence, the 
category of unconscious barriers and constraints can include cognitive representations of the 
world (e.g. attitudes), which can increase the probability of anti-ecological behaviors to occur 
in an automatic and unintended way, given the presence of certain environmental cues. These 
barriers/constraints produce their effect without people being aware of them and can 
influence across different contexts and behaviors (i.e. they are “universal”), as long as the 
activating cues are stable across those contexts and behaviors. The same does not happen 
with perceived barriers and constraints, which often are behavior or domain specific and 
idiosyncratic (e.g. McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999; Black, Stern & Elworth, 1985).  
One example of unconscious barriers and constraints refers to the influence of 
implicit anti-ecological attitudes on ecological behaviors, with research showing that they can 
be more predictive of ecological behavior than explicit attitudes (e.g. Vantomme, Geuens, De 
Houwer & De Pelsmacker, 2005), which are more prone to social desirability effects. 
Research shows that a behavior can be associated to various attitudes supporting it, 
depending on the individual or situation; and yet the attitude that appears to support a 
behavior (explicit attitude) is not always the one most related to it (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar 
de Carvalho, 2004). The attitude with the highest impact on behavior will be the one with 
highest cognitive accessibility (as demonstrated in the MODE model; Fazio, 1990). 
Therefore, if an implicit anti-ecological attitude exists and is stronger (i.e. more accessible) 
than other attitudes influencing a certain behavior, it will affect behavior in accordance with 
its cognitive accessibility. 
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Apart from attitudes, other cognitive representations can have an automatic effect on 
behavior, such as stereotypes, norms and habits. However, there is a gap in ecological- 
behavioral research regarding these variables, since most studies report the influence of 
explicit factors (e.g. Stoll-Kleemann, 2001) and only a few communicate the implicit effect 
(e.g. Vantomme et al., 2005). We will get back to this point and report our own research 
regarding this implicit effect on ecological behaviors and specifically to what concerns the 
effect of habit accessibility. 
Summarizing, we argue in favor of an explanatory approach considering unconscious 
barriers and constraints, given that these variables can affect behavior without people being 
aware of, and thus cannot be analyzed through traditional perception-based measures (e.g. 
questionnaires)4 and dealt with in attitude and behavioral change programs. In order for their 
relevance to be more explicit, we need to show how they relate with perceived 
barriers/constraints and with behavioral goals, in influencing pro-ecological acting. 
Moreover, we should demonstrate how these types of barriers and constraints relate to 
behavioral goals. We will refer to these aspects next. 
 
WHY PEOPLE FAIL TO ACT? - A MODEL PROPOSAL 
 
The research field of negative barriers and constraints is defined as the study of the “I 
don’t understand why it didn’t work” factors, which are considered among the main causes of 
unsuccessful Environmental Education and Behavioral Change projects (Palma-Oliveira & 
Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004). These factors can be included in what we call the DN-Work 
model (“didn’t work”), which we will present here. This model has three main principles: 1) 
barriers and constraints are not defined in terms of the “lack” of strength or absence of 
positive factors -what we call the “lack factors”- but as psychological factors independent 
from these; 2) their influence depends on psychological processes interacting in different 
levels and ways with situational features, and is mediated by the activation of behavioral 
goals2 (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999); and 3) their influence can occur in different degrees of 
awareness and conscious mediation.  
In the first part of the model (see figure 1) the situation is considered as having an 
effect on behavior given the presence of limiting factors, with this category including either 
path: 1) the situational characteristics that activate psychological barriers and constraints, 
through the mediation of conscious/intentional processes or 2) the situational cues that 
activate psychological barriers and constraints, with reduced consciousness and through 
unintentional and automatic processes. Consequently, we call the psychological barriers and 
constraints, which are activated through the first “path”, perceived barriers and constraints; 
while the psychological barriers and constraints which are activated through the second 
“path” are the unconscious barriers and constraints.  
 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
We make a distinction between the two types of situational limiting factors, for the 
purpose of making clear our explanation of the different psychological processes involved in 
each path. However, there is some overlap between “characteristics” and “cues”, given that 
the same limiting factor can sometimes work as one or another, or both. For example, 
watching a neighbor watering the front lawn works as a situational characteristic by eliciting 
the belief that there is water abundance and therefore, conservation is not an urgent matter 
(thus, constraining the behavioral goal of water conservation). At the same time, this event 
can work as a situational cue to activate the implicit norm of spending as much water as we 
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want in watering the lawn, given that it is the behavior that most people engage in at that 
neighborhood (thus, facilitating the anti-behavioral goal of spending water).  
Additionally, there are situations in which different processes are elicited not by the 
same limiting factor but by different limiting factors. One example regards the behavior of 
buying non-organic products such as non-organic milk. On one side, the organic milk high 
price can work as a perceived barrier/constraint to not buy organic, eliciting a high perceived 
cost and incommodity in performing that behavior. On the other side, the presence of non-
organic milk familiar brands can activate the non-organic milk buying habit, which can 
inhibit an intentional organic milk buying goal and increase the probability of performing in 
accordance with a non-organic milk buying goal. We will get back to this example later on. 
Regarding the concept of psychological barriers and constraints on pro-ecological 
behavior, we define them as factors that can: 1) lower the activation strength of pro-
ecological goals and/or increase the activation strength of anti-ecological goals – behavioral 
constraints; 2) elicit the activation of an anti-ecological goal and inhibit the activation of pro-
ecological goals – behavioral barriers. This distinction refers to the magnitude of the effect. 
If a factor has a weak-to-moderate effect, it works as a behavioral constraint by means of a 
goal interference effect - hampering with pro-ecological behavioral goals (i.e. pro-ecological 
actions can still occur, although with reduced frequency or effectiveness). If this factor has a 
strong effect, it works as a behavioral barrier by means of a goal inhibition effect - inhibiting 
pro-ecological behavioral goals (i.e. facilitating anti-ecological behavioral goals, meaning 
that pro-ecological actions cannot occur). 
We make this distinction between barriers and constraints, and in terms of the effect’s 
magnitude, since most of the times in the real world ecological decisions are associated with 
a conflict between pro-ecological and anti-ecological behavioral goals (e.g. decision between 
having a cooperative or competitive behavior; Garcia-Marques & Palma-Oliveira, 1989). 
Which goal “wins” this conflict3 depends on the situation where behavior is expected to 
occur, but also on how barriers and constraints interact. Accordingly, anti-ecological goals 
are expected to be stronger when there is an inhibition effect in addition to an interference 
effect, i.e. when barriers and constraints “work” together. This is supported by the Goal 
Systems Theory (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler 2002), 
which claims that accessible goal alternatives or “background” goals (e.g. anti-ecological) 
can either pull away resources from a focal goal by reducing its activation strength and goal 
commitment or facilitate its activation, depending on what is activated and the context in 
which it happens. The negative effect can happen even when the activation of alternative 
goals is subliminal (priming) by: undermining the commitment to the focal goal, hampering 
progress toward the goal, hindering the development of effective means for goal pursuit and 
dampening participant’s emotional responses to positive and negative feedback about their 
goal striving efforts (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003).  
Unrealistic optimism about environmental degradation (Hatfield & Job, 2001) or 
uncertainty about resource’s level of availability and about how many people are cooperating 
in a pro-ecological way (Biel & Garling, 1995; De Young, 1999) can be considered 
behavioral constraints. This is because they reduce the level of goal commitment (Kruglanski 
et al., 2002) and the strength of a pro-ecological goal intention like “I intend to save water 
while taking a shower”, which causes a goal interference effect. In a different way, the high 
accessibility of an anti-ecological habit (Gaspar de Carvalho, 2009) or its perceived benefits 
in terms of comfort (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) can work as barriers by facilitating the 
activation of an anti-ecological goal such as “spend much water while taking a shower” and 
inhibition of a pro-ecological goal (“conserve water while taking a shower”), which causes a 
goal inhibition effect. 
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Apart from interacting with goals, unconscious barriers and constraints might show 
their effect also indirectly, through their influence on perceived barriers and constraints. An 
example of this is the cognitive inaccessibility of pro-ecological/cooperative behavioral 
options in a social dilemma situation (with the anti-ecological/competitive options being 
more accessible; Biel & Garling, 1995; Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004; Tanner, 
1999). Such a cognitive inaccessibility can affect behavior as an unconscious barrier and/or 
constraint. This can be due to the work of an information-processing heuristic which does not 
take into account all the behavioral options but only some of them, based, for example, on 
some criteria habitually used in similar decisions (Palma-Oliveira, 1995). These cognitive 
options of inaccessibility can promote a perceived lack of opportunities to behave in a pro-
ecological way, which work as a perceived barrier/constraint. Some Environmental Education 
and Behavioral Change projects and psychological models attribute this to the lack of 
opportunities presented by the situation where the person is in, when in fact this perceived 
lack of opportunity might result from cognitive processes.  
As in any new theoretical model, although the DN-Work model is based on theories 
and studies supporting its fundamental claims, there is still not enough research on its specific 
predictions. Given this gap, we will next present research assessing the least studied category 
of the model and the processes involved in its influence on ecological behavior: unconscious 
barriers and constraints. 
 
HABITS AS UNCONSCIOUS BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
Given the lack of success and efficacy in dealing with factors that can explain the 
attitude-behavior inconsistency, our research aims to demonstrate the effect of habit as a 
negative determinant of such inconsistency, trying to overcome the positivity fallacy 
identified before. Moreover, habit is considered to be an unconscious barrier since it is a 
mental representation having an effect outside people’s awareness and conscious control. 
Thus, habit is a true psychological negative determinant of behavior, resulting from an 
interaction between situational and psychological processes. 
Habits are distinct from other forms of repeated automatic behavior (e.g., body 
reflexes) because the former are goal-directed automatic behaviors that are mentally 
represented (as knowledge structures; Higgins 1989) and can be triggered by environmental 
cues (Aarts, Verplanken & van Knippenberg 1998; Verplanken, Aarts & van Knippenberg 
1997). Thus, a pre-condition for them to be performed automatically is the existence of an 
active goal due to the presence of relevant environmental cues. The situation can activate the 
behavioral goal and behavior is performed automatically following that activation. This is 
because there is a goal-action cognitive link and for that reason activating the goal 
automatically elicits the action (Aarts & Dijkterhuis, 2000).  
For example, the development of a habitual domestic behavior of separating garbage 
for recycling, starts with a goal intention such as “I intend to recycle”, which is associated 
with a behavioral goal like “separate garbage for recycling”. The first times this behavior is 
performed involve effort, time and a set of behavioral steps (e.g., categorize the material; 
choose to which container it should go; etc.) and consume cognitive resources. However, 
with frequent co-activation of the behavioral goal and action over time, this effort, time, 
number of behavioral steps and resources consumption are reduced and behavior is 
performed automatically upon activating the goal. This automatic behavior can then occur 
either upon the presence of the relevant cues (e.g. recycling containers at home) without 
people being aware of it or through a conscious activation of the behavioral goal (i.e. upon 
thinking on recycling the waste). Accordingly, research shows that regardless of the source of 
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activation, these two “paths” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) can elicit the same automatic 
behavior (see Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000, experiment 2).  
Apart from this positive effect, habits can also negatively influence ecological attitude 
and behavioral change programs, outside of people’s awareness, upon the presence of 
relevant cues. Moreover, even if people are aware of their habits activation, this might not be 
sufficient to prevent it from occurring, since once the goal is activated automatic behavior is 
expected to occur. In this regard, we performed 2 experimental field studies (Gaspar de 
Carvalho, 2009) to assess how certain characteristics of the decisional context can elicit 
automatic habitual behavior by activating the relevant mental goal-action link, and how this 




In the first study, we aimed to test the assumption that by exposing people to the 
means that allow achieving a behavioral goal, we can increase the probability of goal 
attainment (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003), i.e. that people automatically 
behave or decide according with their goals. For example, if we habitually buy non-organic 
milk, when we are in the supermarket’s milk section, the presence of the non-organic brand X 
that we habitually buy (the mean to attain our milk buying goal) can automatically elicit the 
milk buying goal, and the associated milk buying behavior (buy brand X) can follow. This 
can occur without people being aware that this process was the cause of their behavior or 
without a conscious intention to engage in it (Aarts & Custers, in press). 
Following from this, we aimed to test if in the presence of two types of means 
associated with either the goal to buy organic milk or to buy non-organic milk, people would 
choose significantly more a mean from the first type, in a list with various products (means) 
of both types. This is because the means of the first category co-occurred more often in the 
past with the goal of buying non-organic milk, in a stable context (i.e. given their non-organic 
milk buying habit).  
However, given the situational dependence of goal activation (Kruglanski et al., 
2002), we predicted that this would only happen in a familiar choice context. This is because 
in this context the cues that habitually elicit the non-organic milk buying habit are present 
(e.g. familiar brand). In a different way, if the choice context is new and unknown, there are 
no familiar cues that could activate the buying non-organic milk habit and therefore the 
probability of goal activation should be similar for both organic and non-organic milk buying. 
Thus, regarding the example given before, if the non-organic brand X that we habitually buy 
(i.e., mean) is not present, then our choice will follow a decision process not directly related 




Participants and procedure 
 Eighty students from the University of Lisbon and other individuals were either given 
credits for their participation or volunteered to participate respectively. To participate they 
had to fulfill the criteria of buying food products for domestic consumption at least once per 
week. For this reason, the students that participated were requested to bring in their parents or 
friends that fulfilled these criteria, if they did not.  
The sample consisted mainly on young adults, with an overall mean age of 28.16 
years old (SD=10.52; Min=19; Max= 54) and the majority having a high school degree (60%) 
or a university degree (27.50%). A questionnaire (see description below) portrays them as 
frequent shoppers, shopping for food on an average of twice a week (M=2.10; SD = 1.28). 
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Also, the sample is characterized by a low percentage of reported organic food products 
bought in general (M=12.33%; SD = 19.85) and medium intention to buy organic food in the 
future (M=3.44; SD = 1.78), portraying them as habitual non-organic food buyers. 
Participants were asked to take part in a web-based study on “Health and 
Consumption in Portugal.” After providing their informed consent, they responded to a small 
questionnaire containing the following items: a) socio-demographic and purchase behavior 
items; and b) future intention to buy organic products (1-7 Likert type scale; from Ajzen, 
2002). Subsequently, they performed one of two online shopping simulations4 to choose 
milk, from a list of 12 organic and non-organic products chosen by means of a pre-test, which 
included price, brand and a picture of the product. One task - familiar context - had national 
brands known to the participants (representing familiar means to attain their milk buying 
goal), while the other - new context - had foreign brands, unfamiliar to them. 
In these we maintained price and organic and non-organic products availability 
constant among them, in a proportion of .66 non-organic products and .33 organic products. 
This was because these aspects usually work as post-hoc justifications for not behaving in a 
pro-environmental way and for non-organic products buying habits maintenance. We aimed 
to argue against these justifications, by showing means familiarity as a psychological 
dimension which determines choice, independently from price and availability. A 
representation of the goal system involved in these two tasks can be seen in figure 2. 
 




Fisher’s Exact test results regarding the differences in the choice of non-organic milk 
between the familiar and new context (see table 4), showed that a higher proportion of non-
organic products chosen in the familiar context (.95) compared to the new context (.68) 
(p=.002; Fisher’s exact test).  
These results show that the situation’s influence on behavior is not direct but 
mediated by psychological processes going beyond price and availability of organic food, 
which usually are considered to be the main reasons underlying the decision to buy organic 
food (from a pre-test we performed). In fact, differences in results were explained by 
familiarity (a psychological dimension) rather than those socio-economic factors, with 
significantly more non-organic milk being chosen than the expected proportion in the familiar 
context but not in the novel context. Thus, exposing people to the relevant familiar behavioral 
means (6 non-organic products out of 12) activated the goal associated with the habitual 
behavior, which in turn biased choices toward a habitual mean (1 out of 6 non-organic 





While study 1 aimed to demonstrate the effect of means priming, study 2 aimed to 
also show the effect of goal accessibility associated with the habitual behavior, i.e. a high 
goal accessibility before the choice situation is expected to bias the subsequent choice toward 
a habitually chosen mean (Kruglanski et al., 2002). This was done either by priming the goal 
in a behavioral simulation or dividing the participants into weak vs. strong habit participants 
(the latter expected to have a higher chronic accessibility; Higgins, 1996),  
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The choice situation was again manipulated in terms of familiarity but instead of the 
categories of non-organic and organic milk, there was non-organic milk - habitual product - 
and non-organic orange juice - non-habitual product. Our aim was to not only replicate the 
familiarity effect but also to demonstrate that habitual behavior can still occur in a new 
context, with more habitual than non-habitual products chosen, as long there is a high goal 
accessibility (either through priming or habit strength), based on the prediction that strong 




Participants and procedure 
One hundred and sixty students from the University of Évora, Portugal and other 
participants were either given credits for their participation or volunteered to participate 
respectively (same criteria as in study 1). The sample consisted mainly on young adults, with 
an overall mean age of 25.53 years old (SD=7.56; Min=18; Max= 60) and the majority 
having a high school degree (56.90%) or a university degree (33.10%). There is an overall 
moderate milk buying habit strength (M=4.27; SD=1.42), which is significantly higher that 
the orange juice buying habit strength (M=2.41; SD=1.37) (t(159)=12.00; p<.000). 
Participants were asked to take part in a web-based study on “Health and 
Consumption in Portugal.” After providing their informed consent, participants were 
requested to write a brief description of their behavior in a certain situation (goal priming): 
“Imagine that you need to go shopping for the week’s breakfasts or lunches in your house 
and in order to do that you go to the nearest supermarket/local store. Once you get there, you 
decide to buy bread and milk. Please describe what you would do from the time you arrive at 
each product section in the supermarket/local store, until the time you choose what you want 
to take, writing in the space below the options available in there and the way you make your 
choice for each of the two products.” The participants in the irrelevant buying goal accessible 
condition did the same task but with milk being substituted by water. In this, only the milk 
goal had the opportunity to be attained, given that the subsequent task had a list of milk and 
orange juice products to choose from. The idea here is that, priming stimulates or activates 
the stored knowledge (Higgins, 1996) and thus providing people with a behavioral goal (buy 
milk), should increase its accessibility (and consequently, the mental representation of the 
associated habit) and therefore, the probability of automatically choosing milk when 
opportunity arises. After this, participants performed two online shopping tasks (within-
participants) with a choice of milk and orange juice with national brands (familiar context) 
and foreign brands (new context), in a way similar to study 1). A representation of the goal 
system involved in these two tasks can be seen in figure 3. 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
 
Finally, they performed a questionnaire in which reported their non-organic products 
buying habit by responding to the Self Report Habit Index (1-7 Likert type scale; Verplanken 
& Orbell, 2003), which allowed to create the weak vs. strong habit participants groups. based 




McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar 
and new context when the target goal was accessible (see table 1) showed a significantly 
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higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-habitual 
product (orange juice) in the new context and the habitual (milk) in the familiar context 
(23.75%) comparing to the opposite revision (3.75%) (p=.001; McNemar). For the accessible 
irrelevant goal results showed a significantly higher percentage of participants which revised 
their choice, by choosing the non-habitual product in the new context and the habitual in the 
familiar context (32.5%) comparing to the opposite revision (6.25%) (p=.000; McNemar). 
Moreover, there is in this condition a higher choice consistency for the habitual (38.75%) 
than the non-habitual products (22.5%) between contexts, although this difference is 
marginally significant. 
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
As expected, the majority of the strong habit participants chose the habitual product 
consistently between contexts (58.97%; p=.000; McNemar). The weak habit participants 
chose more the habitual product in the familiar context and the non-habitual product in the 
new context (45%; p=.002; McNemar). Given their weak habit, their mental representation is 
inferred to be more unstable than for the strong habit participants and thus they are more 
affected by the context changes. At the same time, they are “aided” by the context, with the 
weak chronic accessibility being compensated by the context familiarity. 
On one side, this shows that habits can have an effect across situations (strong habits 
effect) and that their power is sometimes underestimated. On the other side, our goal priming 
seems to have failed and even resulted in an almost opposite pattern, with less consistency in 
the habitual products chosen when the milk goal was primed (compared to the control 
condition). One explanation is that the goal priming might have elicited a monitoring process 
in which some participants compared the options available with their milk buying habit. If a 
weak match between habit and the available means in the decision task was perceived, they 
chose more the non-habitual product. Thus a contrast effect might have occurred because the 
priming was supraliminal and they were aware that their habits were brought to mind 




Most of the Environmental Education and Behavior Change projects and models 
regarding ecological behavior are still biased by a “positivity fallacy”, i.e. the belief that as 
long as people have the right attitudes, intentions, skills, information, etc., the right pro-
ecological behavior should follow. However, the social sciences literature shows that there is 
an inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors in this regard and that the difficulty in 
changing behaviors is being underestimated. One reason for this to occur is that the factors 
working as barriers and constraints to ecological behavior are not analyzed and dealt with. In 
this regard, a behavioral analysis that includes the “negative” determinants should be 
performed.  
Models studying the negative determinants of pro-environmental behavior consider 
that most barriers and constraints are non-psychological. Even those models acknowledging 
the importance of psychological barriers and constraints only see a part of the big picture. 
This is because they do not consider the effect of automatic processes occurring outside 
people’s awareness and consciousness, which mediate the effect of situations on behavior. 
In our studies we aimed to fill these identified gaps through the DN-Work model, 
concerning the effect of barriers and constraints on pro-ecological behavior. This model 
specifies some conditions for their influence to take place, presenting psychological processes 
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as mediators of situational influences on behavior, and transcending the incomplete and 
sometimes erroneous consideration of a direct influence of the former on the latter. 
Accordingly, this chapter presented two examples from empirical research showing that habit 
- defined as a goal-dependent automatic behavior – can work as a negative determinant of 
ecological behavior, outside people’s awareness and control. These studies demonstrated that 
automatic habitual behavior can be elicited by situational features (the means in the choice 
context) or by chronic accessibility, which determined the subsequent behavior in the 
decision making tasks. Additionally, some control over the habitual choice is possible, 
although habitual behavior awareness (study 2) seems to be necessary. This has evident 
implications for the development of Environmental Education and Behavior Change projects 
because habit can work as an unconscious barrier by making anti-ecological goals stronger 
and more accessible, without the mediation of consciousness.  
Thus, our model and studies suggest that the investigation of pro-ecological behaviors 
should be conducted not only by considering the different levels of individuals’ analysis  
(person, group, society, world) but also by considering the different levels of the situation 
where behavior occurs (Pinheiro, 2009). This means that the situation should be approached 
from the most concrete level of analysis regarding physical features and tangible aspects, up 
to the most abstract level considering those characteristics and events associated with social 
environments, like other people’s behaviors, attitudes, etc. One common error in this regard 
is the assessment of people’s habits (at the individual level) as only determined by the social 
environment (e.g. neighbors; family living in the same house) and/or the city environment 
(e.g. urban planning). Often, this implies missing the influence of psychological processes in 
a more concrete level of the situation (the “psychological context”), in terms of the elicitation 
of automatic behaviors from certain situational cues. Only by matching these different levels 
of ecological-behavior analysis and considering the different influences associated with them, 
we can “bring back” the situation to the psychological study of barriers and constraints 
impinging on ecological behavior. 
Although the viewpoint presented in this chapter (i.e., the study of negative 
determinants) seems like a pessimistic approach to the study of ecological behavior, we think 
this is actually an optimistic perspective. In fact, by identifying factors increasing the 
inconsistency between positive attitudes and ecological behaviors, we will be able to design 
interventions focusing on these factors and increase the success and efficacy of attitude 
behavior change programs. On the contrary, it is the design of interventions including only 
positive determinants and involving an incomplete explanatory level of the psychological 
processes involved that makes us pessimistic regarding the promotion of ecological behaviors 
and their maintenance in the long run. 
As Corral-Verdugo (2001; pg. 149) states: “Given the complexity of ecological 
problems, it is better to respond in a plastic than in a rigid way”. This plasticity can be 
developed by increasing people’s environmental competency (Corral-Verdugo, 2002; see also 
Fraijo-Sing et al, in this book) in a way that individuals are enabled to resist the influence of 
barriers and constraints on ecological behavior. Whenever they are or are not able to 
perceive/identify those barriers and constraints by themselves, strategies aimed to increase 
people’s competence in dealing with them should be developed (Gaspar de Carvalho & 
Coutinho de Faria, 2003). 
Other negative determinants still need to be identified and the processes involved 
should be assessed with various methodologies. Nevertheless, the model here described and 
its associated research can be a starting point to answer, from a psychological perspective, an 
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Footnotes 
       1 In the last few decades, implicit perception-based measures have been used in ecological 
behavior research, as is the case of the Implicit Association Test (see Vantomme et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, this is still not enough to tap into the processes involved in developing attitude-
behavior inconsistency; other methodological tools are still needed to provide a more 
complete picture. 
       2 Goal can be defined as “an internal representation of a desired state, such as a behavior or 
outcome (Aarts & Custers, in press). 
       3 When there are multiple goals competing, only the “winning” goal will be translated into 
behavior; i.e. it will reach the goal operation phase (Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
       4 HTML pages developed with Comersus Cart Software (Comersus Open Technologies 
L.C. 2004) 
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Table 1 
Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context for the goal 
priming manipulations with McNemar’s test 
Target goal 







Non-hab. 29 3 
Familiar 
context 
Hab. 19 29 
n.s. p=.001 
Irrelevant goal 







Non-hab. 18 5 
Familiar 
context 
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Figure caption 
Figure 1. DN-Work model of barriers and constraints on ecological behavior  
Figure 2. Goal-means structure representation for each type of context manipulation 
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